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Messin' with Texas: How the Fifth Circuit's Decision in Oscar
Private Equity Misinterprets the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory*
Last May, the Fifth Circuit unexpectedly deviated from federal
precedent in the realm of class action securities litigation. In Oscar
Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc.,' the court

fashioned a greater hurdle for plaintiffs seeking class certification in
an action under the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 10b5.2

Departing from Supreme Court precedent, Basic Inc. v.

Levinson,3 the Fifth Circuit held that, to reach the fraud-on-themarket presumption of reliance and acquire class certification, the
plaintiff must prove "that [a] misstatement actually moved the
market."4 As a result, the court introduced a new and more difficult
standard for materiality, ultimately tying together two separate and
distinct elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim-loss causation and relianceat an early stage in litigation.5 Yet the court failed to acknowledge
that its new standard will likely frustrate the purposes behind Rule
10b-5: promoting honesty and full disclosure in financial markets.6
Moreover, the holding may usher in a host of negative policy

* Copyright © 2008 by Tad E.Thompson.
1. 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007). A summary of the facts of this case may be useful for
a better understanding of the issue. In Oscar, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed whether the trial court's decision to grant the plaintiff's motion for class
certification was improper. Plaintiffs brought suit against defendant telecommunication
company because of alleged stock investment losses the plaintiffs suffered due to certain
misstatements in the defendant's financial statements in the first, second, and third
quarters of 2001. Id. at 262-63. The quarterly financial statements indicated that the
defendant installed a much larger number of telecommunication lines than it had actually
installed. Id. at 263. In the final quarter of 2001, the defendant released a corrective
disclosure restating the year's installations, attributing the misrepresentation to a change
in the company's recording process. Id. At the same time, defendant released other
negative information concerning the company, and the corporation's stock price
plummeted. Id. Plaintiffs filed suit, moving for class certification, and the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted class certification. Id.
Defendants filed this interlocutory appeal. Id.
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
3. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
4. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 265.
5. See id. at 264-65 (defining "material" in a manner which ties together the reliance
and loss causation elements of Rule 10b-5). For further discussion on how the Oscar
holding mistakenly ties together these two elements of the claim, see infra notes 18-23 and
accompanying text.
6. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 230.
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implications by placing a greater burden on plaintiffs seeking class
certification.
This Recent Development will argue that the Fifth Circuit's new
limitation on the fraud-on-the-market theory is inconsistent with the
stance taken by the Supreme Court and that the new standard will
erode the public policy concerns behind Rule 10b-5 and the fraud-onthe-market theory.7 Specifically, it will begin by demonstrating that
the standard for materiality has already been established by both
common-law fraud doctrines as well as the Supreme Court and that
the Fifth Circuit's requirement that the misstatement actually affect
the stock price is inconsistent with the preexisting definition. Second,
this Recent Development will illustrate how Oscar's new standard
impermissibly shifts the fraud-on-the-market theory from a
rebuttable presumption in favor of the plaintiffs to a new burden on
the plaintiff class. Finally, it will argue that the Fifth Circuit's holding
frustrates the purposes of both the fraud-on-the-market theory and
Rule 10b-5 and significantly limits the scope of recovery available for
plaintiffs in securities fraud class action lawsuits.
To assert a successful Rule 10b-5 claim,8 a plaintiff must prove six
elements:
(1) a material misrepresentation (or omission);
(2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of mind;
(3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security;

7. These public policy considerations are analyzed in more detail later. See infra
notes 36-47 and accompanying text (full and honest disclosure and market participation);
infra notes 48-65 and accompanying text (the allocation of the burden of proving
reliance); infra notes 66-75 and accompanying text (the availability of class certification).
8. Rule 10b-5 prohibits anyone from "mak[ing] any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit[ting] to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made
... not misleading ... in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2007). This regulation provides a remedy for any party injured through a
purchase of stock made in reliance upon what is essentially fraud-a material
misstatement or omission. As numerous courts have held, "Rule 10b-5 is violated
whenever assertions are made, as here, in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the
investing public ... if such assertions are false or misleading or are so incomplete as to
mislead." SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (in banc), rev'd
on other grounds, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971); see, e.g., In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d
11, 36 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that a company owes a duty of disclosure if such disclosure
is necessary to prevent prior statements from being misleading); In re Phillips Petroleum
Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244-47 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying the Texas Gulf Sulphur
standard to vacate the portion of the lower court's decision dismissing the plaintiff's Rule
10b-5 claim); Colvin v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 477 F.2d 1283, 1286 (5th Cir. 1973)
(stating that it is a violation of Rule 10b-5 to make material misstatements or omissions of
fact in connection with a purchase or sale of securities).
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reliance, often referred to in ... fraud-on-the-market cases
as "transaction causation,";
(5) economic loss; and
(6) "loss causation," i.e., a causal connection between the
material misrepresentation and the loss.9

(4)

In a class action lawsuit based on Rule 10b-5, it would be
impractical to require each class member to individually prove the
reliance element of the claim.1" Thus, the Supreme Court recognized
the fraud-on-the-market theory, which creates a rebuttable
presumption that each class member has satisfied the reliance
requirement of Rule 10b-5. 11 The plaintiff class may take advantage
of this presumption so long as they can demonstrate three conditions:
"First, the information in question must have been material. Second,
the market must have been sufficiently active to be deemed to be
efficient. Third, the misinformation must have been disseminated
publicly."' 2
Analyzing the first of these conditions, materiality, the Oscar
court held that there must be "proof that the misstatement actually
moved the market."1 3 Yet in making this declaration, the Fifth Circuit
failed to acknowledge that the Supreme Court has already established

9. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 264 n.5 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336,
341-42 (2005)). For the purpose of this Recent Development, the only significant
elements of the claim are materiality, reliance, and loss causation. While each of these
elements is discussed more fully throughout the paper, it may be useful at this point to
analyze loss causation in greater detail. In describing the requirement of loss causation,
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act states that "the plaintiff shall have the
burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate this chapter
caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4)
(2000). As analyzed by the most recent Supreme Court case concerning the issue, loss
causation is essentially proximate causation linking the defendant's material misstatement
or omission to the plaintiffs economic injury. Dura,544 U.S. at 344.
10. See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. at 242 (Blackmun, J., plurality) ("Requiring proof of
individualized reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff class effectively would
have prevented respondents from proceeding with a class action, since individual issues
then would have overwhelmed the common ones.").
11. Id. at 241-47. Notably a majority of the bench did not endorse the portion of the
Basic holding concerning the fraud-on-the-market theory. Justice Blackmun authored the
Court's opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. Justices White and 0'
Connor concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing with the Court's analysis of
materiality but disagreeing with the discussion of the application of the fraud-on-themarket theory as applied to the facts in Basic. Id. at 250. Chief Justice Rehnquist, as well
as Justices Scalia and Kennedy, took no part in the case.
12. 3 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§ 12.10[6][A] (5th ed. 2005) (citations omitted); see Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n.27 (Blackmun,
J., plurality); Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 2004).
13. Oscar,487 F.3d at 265.
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a definition of materiality in the context of securities fraud litigation. 4
In fact, in the case in which the Supreme Court first recognized the
fraud-on-the-market theory, Justice Blackmun noted that "[t]he
Court also explicitly has defined a standard of materiality under the
securities laws ... concluding in the proxy-solicitation context that 'an
omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how
to vote.' "15 Thus, "to fulfill the materiality requirement 'there must
be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the "total mix" of information made
available.' "16 The Court then went on to "expressly adopt" that
standard for materiality in regard to Rule 10b-5. 7
The key difference between the materiality definition established
by the Supreme Court and the one employed in Oscar is that the
Supreme Court's standard did not require proof that the
misrepresentation or omission actually affected the stock price. 8 The
High Court's standard simply required that the misrepresentation or
omission be one that a reasonable investor would find significant in
making investment decisions." By adding the additional requirement
that the distortion or omission actually change the market price of the
security, the Fifth Circuit tied together two elements of the Rule 10b-

14. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 231.
15. Id. (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)); see, e.g.,
Prudent Real Estate Trust v. Johncamp Realty, 599 F.2d 1140, 1146 (2d Cir. 1979) (using
the test for materiality set forth in TSC Industries); Hassig v. Pearson, 565 F.2d 644, 650
(10th Cir. 1977) (employing the "reasonable shareholder" standard established in TSC
Industries).
16. Basic, 485 U.S. at 231-32 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S.
438, 449 (1976)).
The Supreme Court continued to expound upon this concept,

presumably to ensure that their standard was clear regarding materiality of misstatements.
" 'The determination [of materiality] requires delicate assessments of the inferences a
"reasonable shareholder" would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of
those inferences to him ......."Id. at 236 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426

U.S. 438, 450 (1976)). The Court made clear that "materiality depends on the significance
the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented information." Id.

at 240.
17. Id. at 232, 249.
18. Compare id. at 231 (" '[A]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote.' " (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976))), with Oscar,

487 F.3d at 265 ("We now require more than proof of a material misstatement; we require
proof that the misstatement actually moved the market.").
19. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 231-32.
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5 claim-material misrepresentation and loss causation 2 0-together.
But even Justices White and O'Connor's partially concurring and
partially dissenting opinion in Basic recognized that these two
elements of the claim are separate and should remain so. 2 1 The

presumption arising from the fraud-on-the-market theory is simply
one of reliance.22 It should neither affect nor involve the loss
causation element of a 10b-5 claim, as that is a totally separate
requirement of the cause of action.23
The Oscar court stated that the Supreme Court's opinion in
"Basic 'allows each of the circuits room to develop its own fraud-on-

the-market rules.' ,24 The Fifth Circuit, however, seems to have
exceeded the Court's limits. Rather than merely lending its own
judgment in the face of ambiguous terms, the Oscar court completely
disregarded the explicit definition of material misrepresentation as
established by the Supreme Court when it adopted the fraud-on-themarket theory.25 Moreover, in fashioning its own rule, the Fifth
Circuit ignored the High Court's warning in Basic that no bright-line
rules should be established regarding materiality. 26 The Basic Court

concurred with the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure's
advice against such a bright-line test:
Although the Committee believes that ideally it would be
desirable to have absolute certainty in the application of the

materiality concept, it is its view that such a goal is illusory and
20. See Oscar,487 F.3d at 264 n.5 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336,
341-42 (2005)).
21. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 251 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("At the outset, I note that there are portions of the Court's fraud-on-the-market holding
with which I am in agreement. Most importantly, the Court rejects the version of that
theory, heretofore adopted by some courts, which equates 'causation' with 'reliance'...."
(citations omitted)).
22. See id. at 245 (Blackmun, J., plurality); 3 HAZEN, supra note 12, § 12.10[6][A]
("[A] number of courts fashioned a fraud-on-the-market presumption for proving
reliance." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
23. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005) (listing the elements
of a Rule 10b-5 claim).
24. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 264 (quoting Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1120
(5th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989)).
Whether or not this statement is true is irrelevant for the purposes of this Recent
Development. Still, it is important to note that the Abell court did not base its claim-that
the circuits may define Rule 10b-5 as they see fit-on any precedent. Moreover, that court
did not quote any language in the Basic decision indicating such a power in the federal
circuits. In light of this, it would seem rather peculiar that the Supreme Court would grant
the circuits power to disregard its explicit holding.
25. Basic, 485 U.S. at 224.
26. See id. at 236.
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unrealistic. The materiality concept is judgmental in nature and

it is not possible to translate this into a numerical formula. The
Committee's

advice

to

the

[Securities

and

Exchange

Commission] is to avoid this quest for certainty and to continue
consideration of materiality on a case-by-case
disclosure problems are identified.27

basis as

The Supreme Court followed its recantation of this quotation with
its
28
own guidance: "Courts also would do well to heed this advice.,
Yet the Fifth Circuit did not just ignore the explicitly established
Supreme Court standard. The Oscar court also failed to grasp the
basic foundation of the elements of a Rule 10b-5 action-the tort of
fraud.2 9 In the context of fraud, a "[representation is] material if a

reasonable person would want to consider the fact represented in
determining whether to enter the transaction in question."3 Indeed,
some early cases analyzing Rule 10b-5 "looked to the Restatement of

Torts in defining materiality in terms of whether a reasonable person
'would attach importance [to the act misrepresented] in determining
his choice of action in the transaction in question.' "31 There is,
however, an important distinction between the Rule 10b-5 action for
fraud and the tort doctrine: Rule 10b-5 was meant to add greater

protection than that offered at common law by reducing the standard

27. Id. at 236 n.14 (quoting STAFF OF H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMI-irEE ON CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 327 (Comm. Print

1977)); see also 3 HAZEN, supra note 12, § 12.10[6][A] ("It has repeatedly been held that
the concept of materiality cannot be distilled into a bright-line test." (citations omitted)).
28. Basic, 485 U.S. at 236.
29. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005) ("Judicially implied
private securities fraud actions [such as Rule 10b-5 actions] resemble in many (but not all)
respects common-law deceit and misrepresentation actions."); LOUIS LOSS & JOEL
SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 910-18 (5th ed. 2004)
(explaining the common-law fraud foundation for Securities and Exchange Commission
fraud actions and comparing the two). The elements of common-law fraud include:
(1) a false representation of (2) a material (3) fact; (4) the defendant must know of
the falsity (this kind of knowledge is called "scienter"), but make the statement
nevertheless for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to rely on it; and (5) the
plaintiff must justifiably rely on it, and (6) suffer damages as a consequence.
LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra, at 910. To compare these requirements to those for a Rule
10b-5 action, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
30. 35 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OFTORTS § 476 (2000).
31. 3 HAZEN, supra note 12, § 12.9[3] (citing List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457,
462 (2d Cir. 1965)); see, e.g., LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 29, at 915-17 (discussing the
relationship between common-law fraud and Rule 10b-5).
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of proof.3 2 Such heightened protection is likely a product of the
fundamental difference between common face-to-face transactions
and securities market transactions.
As the Supreme Court
recognized:
The modern securities markets, literally involving millions of
shares changing hands daily, differ from the face-to-face

transactions contemplated by early fraud cases, and our
understanding of Rule 10b-5's reliance requirement must
encompass these differences. "In face to face transactions, the

inquiry into an investor's reliance upon information is into the
subjective pricing of that information by that investor. With the
presence of a market, the market is interposed between seller
and buyer and, ideally, transmits information to the investor in
the processed form of a market price. Thus the market is
performing a substantial part of the valuation process
performed by the investor in a face-to-face transaction. The
market is acting as the unpaid agent of the investor, informing

32. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. -,...
128
S. Ct. 761, 777 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Olur prior cases explained that to the
extent that 'the antifraud provisions of the securities laws are not coextensive with
common-law doctrines of fraud,' it is because common-law fraud doctrines might be too
restrictive." (quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1983)));
Basic, 485 U.S. at 244 n.22 (Blackmun, J., plurality) ("Actions under Rule 10b-5 are
distinct from common-law deceit and misrepresentation claims ...and are in part
designed to add to the protections provided investors by the common law ....). The
Supreme Court addressed this issue in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375
(1983):
The Court of Appeals relied primarily on the traditional use of a higher burden of
proof in civil fraud actions at common law .... Reference to common-law
practices can be misleading, however, since the historical considerations
underlying the imposition of a higher standard of proof have questionable
pertinence [in a Rule 10b-5 action] .... Indeed, an important purpose of the
federal securities statutes was to rectify perceived deficiencies in the available
common-law protections by establishing higher standards of conduct in the
securities industry.
Id. at 388-89 (citations omitted). While the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 ("PSLRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2000), seems to impose some heightened pleading
requirements in many portions of the Rule 10b-5 action, the PSLRA does not increase the
loss causation requirement in pleadings. See Teachers' Ret. Sys. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162,
185 (4th Cir. 2007). It is true that the plaintiff will ultimately bear the burden of proving
loss causation. Dura, 544 U.S. at 345-46. However, the plaintiffs should not bear the
burden of actually proving loss causation at the class certification stage. Id. at 346. This is
a critical distinction because the Oscar court demanded the higher standard of proof in
order to allow class certification. See Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom,
Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 2007). For further analysis of why causation proof should
not be required at class certification, see infra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
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him that given all the information available to it, the value of
the stock is worth the market price."33
Aside from the differences between face-to-face transactions and

financial market transactions, there are at least three additional
justifications supporting heightened fraud protections. The first of
these, relied upon by the Supreme Court in establishing the fraud-onthe-market presumption, is the Efficient Market Hypothesis.

This

theory states that, in an active financial market, any material
information regarding a company will affect that company's stock

price.34 In fact, the Supreme Court discussed this notion in describing
the basis for the fraud-on-the-market theory: " '[I]n an open and
developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is
determined by the available material information regarding the
company and its business .... Misleading statements will therefore
defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely
on the misstatements . . .. ' "I' Thus, due to the unique connection of

information and security prices, courts should afford greater
protection under Rule 10b-5 than is offered in other common-law
fraud actions.

A second justification for the heightened level of protection in
Rule 10b-5 actions is contained in the legislative purpose behind the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, under which the Securities and
Exchange Commission promulgated Rule 10b-5. The Basic Court

referred to the "legislative philosophy [that] '[t]here cannot be honest
markets without honest publicity.' "36 In fact, the Court " 'repeatedly
has described the fundamental purpose of the [Securities Exchange
Act of 1934] as implementing a philosophy of full disclosure.' ,31
Thus, to effectuate the legislative purpose of promoting full and

33. Basic, 485 U.S. at 243-44 (Blackmun, J., plurality) (quoting In re LTV Sec. Lit., 88
F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980)).
34. See Zvi BODIE, ALEX KANE & ALAN J. MARCUS, ESSENTIALS OF INVESTMENT

260-87 (International ed. 2003). The text defines this theory as "[tihe hypothesis that
prices of securities fully reflect available information about securities." Id. at 262. The
authors explain that as soon as new information is made available concerning a security,
investors will trade on that information to bring "its price to a fair level." Id. at 262; see
also H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 11 (1934) ("The idea of a free and open public market is
built upon the theory that competing judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair price of
a security brings [sic] about a situation where the market price reflects as nearly as
possible a just price.").
35. Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-42 (Blackmun, J., plurality) (citing Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d
1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
36. Id. at 230 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 11 (1934)).
37. Id. (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977)).
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honest disclosure, courts should increase the level of protection and
recourse available to investors who trade based on misrepresentations
by lowering the standard of proof necessary to establish materiality of
misstatements.
A third justification, which could be viewed as a subset of the
second justification, is the facilitation of market participation. By
promoting a legislative scheme that insures the information available
to investors is as complete and accurate as possible, the legislature
will foster an environment that is more welcoming to hesitant and
skeptical investors. At least one court has noted the importance of
full disclosure in regard to market participation:
The importance of accurate and complete issuer disclosure to
the integrity of the securities markets cannot be
overemphasized. To the extent that investors cannot rely upon
the accuracy and completeness of issuer statements, they will be
less likely to invest, thereby reducing the liquidity of the
securities markets to the detriment of investors and issuers
alike.38
Thus, by demonstrating increased protections for investors who, to
their detriment, trade on inaccurate information, courts foster a more
hospitable market, encourage investment, and increase liquidity
through enhanced participation.
Yet in spite of the Supreme Court's recognition of heightened
protection and lowered standards of proof for materiality in Rule
10b-5 actions, the Oscar court seems to have gone in the opposite
direction. Rather than looking out for investors, the Fifth Circuit
seems to have placed an additional barrier in the path of a claimant
alleging securities fraud. In requiring satisfaction of the sort of
bright-line test the Basic Court cautioned against,39 the Oscar court
38. In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, 33 SEC Docket 1025, 1030
(July 8, 1985). This is also addressed in Stoneridge Investment Partners, L.L.C. v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008):
"Holding liable wrongdoers who actively engage in fraudulent conduct that lacks a
legitimate business purpose ... enhances[] the integrity of our markets and our
economy. We believe that the integrity of our securities markets is their strength.
Investors, both domestic and foreign, trust that fraud is not tolerated in our
nation's securities markets and that strong remedies exist to deter and protect
against fraud and to recompense investors when it occurs[.]"
Id. at __ 128 S. Ct. at 778 n.10 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Motion for Leave
To File Brief Out of Time and Brief Amici Curiae of Former SEC Commissioners in
Support of Petitioners at 4, Stoneridge, 552 U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 761 (No. 06-43)).
39. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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has significantly lessened the protection and recourse available for
injured investors. The Fifth Circuit questioned the fundamental logic
behind the Efficient Market Hypothesis' rather than acknowledging
the well-recognized theory, thus straying into the dense field of
financial theory in which the court has little knowledge or expertise.4 1
Moreover, the court frustrates the basic legislative purpose of full
and accurate disclosure that is at the foundation of Rule 10b-5.42 In

fact, the court's new standard for materiality-"proof that the
misstatement actually moved the market" 4 3 -creates a loophole for
dishonesty. Specifically, the Oscar court held that "when unrelated
negative statements are announced contemporaneous of a corrective

disclosure [of prior positive misrepresentations], the plaintiff must
prove 'that it is more probable than not that it was this [corrective
disclosure], and not other unrelated negative statements, that caused
a significant amount of the decline.' ""

This standard allows

40. Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 269-70 (5th
Cir. 2007).
41. In fact, it seems likely that, in this specific instance, the court has botched the
financial theory behind the Efficient Market Hypothesis as it applied to the Oscar case.
The court listed two arguments as to why misrepresentations regarding the security would
not affect the price-selective efficiency (implying a semi-strong form efficient market)
and strong form efficiency. Id. at 269-70. Regarding the court's first argument, "the idea
that a share price might be somehow selectively efficient would seem to run counter to the
basic notion of the semi-strong form." E-mail from William Beedles, Professor of
Finance, University of Kansas School of Business, to Tad E. Thompson (Sept. 29, 2007,
11:32 EST) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). As for the court's contention
that the market might be strong form efficient, "we know that stock prices aren't strong
form efficient[,] and while the opinion presents an academically interesting hypothesis, it's
empirically untrue." E-mail from Laura Tuttle, Professor of Accounting and Finance,
American University of Sharjah, to Tad E. Thompson (Sept. 24, 2007, 01:26 EST) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review). It may be true that, to make rulings, courts often
have to delve into fields in which they lack expertise. But the Oscar court's venture into
financial theory seems particularly egregious, as the court chose to deny class certification
and keep the merits of the case from reaching trial based largely on a theory the court
misunderstood and misapplied. Although granting class certification and allowing the case
to reach trial would likely not give the court complete expertise in the matter, this author
believes that it would have allowed the court to make a more informed decision founded
on greater understanding, as the adversary process would have more adequately explained
the theory to the trier of fact. Nevertheless, analysis of the court's management of the
hypothesis is outside the scope of this Recent Development and unnecessary for the
argument found herein.
42. See H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 11 (1934) (noting that the purpose behind the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is that full disclosure will promote honest markets).
43. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 265.
44. Id. at 270 (quoting Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 666 (5th Cir.
2004)). Oscar involved a fact pattern where the corporate defendant revealed a prior
misrepresentation while releasing other negative information about the company's
performance. See id. at 263.
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corporations that have previously made material misrepresentations a
way to avoid liability by shrouding their corrective statements in
other concurrently released negative information, thus making it
more difficult for injured investors to acquire relief. Such a loophole
thwarts the legislative purpose of full disclosure by allowing
corporations a way to escape legal accountability for inaccurate
statements and material omissions.
Finally, this loophole will not facilitate market integrity and
participation. Despite recognizing a state of "Enron-itis 45 and the
"increasingly skeptical market, 46 the court blazed on with its new
heightened standard of proof for materiality. Ordinary logic cautions
that, by increasing the standard of proof necessary for a remedy in
securities fraud actions, the court will frighten off weary or hesitant
investors. This is the exact result courts have cautioned against-that
investors fearful of dishonest markets "will be less likely to invest,
thereby reducing the liquidity of the securities markets to the
detriment of investors and issuers alike."47

In addition to misinterpreting the standard for materiality, the
Oscar decision effectively changes fraud-on-the-market from a
presumption in favor of plaintiffs to a burden that plaintiffs must
prove.
The fraud-on-the-market theory creates a rebuttable
presumption of reliance.48 The Supreme Court found that such a
presumption "is consistent with, and, by facilitating Rule 10b-5
litigation, supports, the congressional policy embodied in the
[Securities Exchange Act of 1934]." 49 The Court also instructed "that

[defendants] may rebut proof of the elements giving rise to the
presumption[] or show that the misrepresentation in fact did not lead
to a distortion of price or that an individual plaintiff traded or would
45. Id. at 270 (quoting James Ott of Hibernia Southcoast Capital).
46. Id.
47. In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, 33 SEC Docket 1025, 1030
(July 8, 1985). This statement may seem a bit melodramatic. It is not the author's position
that the Fifth Circuit's decision will destroy capital markets as we know them.
Nevertheless, there is a strong argument that this decision will have a detrimental impact
on risk-averse, borderline investors.
48. 3 HAZEN, supranote 12, § 12.10[6][A] (citations omitted).
49. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988) (Blackmun, J., plurality). The
Court supported this proposition, stating, "[i]n
drafting that Act, Congress expressly relied
on the premise that securities markets are affected by information, and enacted legislation
to facilitate an investor's reliance on the integrity of those markets." Id. at 245-46. The
Court went on to conclude "[tihe presumption is also supported by common sense and
probability. Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress's premise that the
market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available
information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations." Id. at 246.
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have traded despite his knowing the statement was false."5 As the
Basic Court noted, "[a]ny showing that severs the link between the

alleged misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by
the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be
sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance."5 Thus, under the
Supreme Court's standard, once the plaintiff has established the
elements necessary for the fraud-on-the-market presumption of
reliance,52 the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the
presumption should not stand.53 A significant part of the Supreme
Court's analysis of the ability to rebut this presumption is that the
defendant must "show" that the presumption should not stand. 4 The
Court enumerated several examples of how a defendant can
The important
demonstrate the presumption's inapplicability.
aspect of these examples is that each places the burden on the
Thus, the Court's
defendant to overcome the presumption.56
language seems to indicate that the defendant cannot simply rebut
fraud-on-the-market by raising the possibility that the presumption
should not stand.
Yet the Oscar court departs from this standard. In fact, the Fifth
Circuit's decision implies that the "presumption evaporates as soon as
a defendant simply introduces a mere possibility the defendant's
material misrepresentation might not have affected the market price"
and places the burden back onto the plaintiffs.5" This is inconsistent
50. Id. at 248.
51. Id.
52. Those elements are as follows: (1) the misrepresentation was material, (2) the
market was sufficiently active, and (3) the misstatements or omissions were made public.
See Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir.
2007); 3 HAZEN, supranote 12, § 12.10[6][A].
53. 3 HAZEN, supra note 12, § 12.10[6][A] (citations omitted).
54. Basic, 285 U.S. at 248 (Blackmun, J., plurality) (emphasis added).
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. The Basic Court explains that, in demonstrating that the fraud-on-the-market
presumption should not apply, the defendant may "show that the misrepresentation in fact
did not lead to a distortion of price" and may offer a "showing that severs the link
between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price" of the security or the
plaintiff's reliance. Id. The Court's language concerning both methods implies that the
defendant must make an affirmative demonstration-a showing-to fight the presumption
of reliance.
58. Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 274 (5th Cir.
2007) (Dennis, J., dissenting). The dissent notes that the majority opinion "conspicuously
neglects to explain what type of evidence a defendant would have to produce to meet its
standard." Id. at 274. Likewise, the majority is cryptic as to what kind and amount of
proof would be necessary when the burden shifts to the plaintiff. See id. at 270-71
(majority opinion) ("[U]nder these circumstances, proof of a corrective disclosure's
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with the purpose of the presumption. The Supreme Court recognized
that the presumption exists in favor of plaintiffs in class action
litigation because, if each class member had to prove individual
reliance, certification would always fail as individual questions would
overwhelm common ones among the class members. 9 The
presumption of materiality was the Court's recognition6 of the proper
"[allocation of] the burdens of proof between parties., 1
To be sure, there are legitimate reasons why the courts might
want to lessen the force of the fraud-on-the-market presumption. If
plaintiffs can easily satisfy the requisite elements for class certification
in a Rule 10b-5 action, they can create "an extraordinary aggregation
of claims," thus putting defendants at risk of tremendous losses
should the trial turn against them. 61 The potential of such large losses
would heavily incentivize defendants to settle after the class
certification. It seems this recognition was critical to the Oscar
court's holding.62 Its conclusion, that "a district court's certification
order often bestows upon plaintiffs extraordinary leverage," signaled
to it " 'important due process concerns of both plaintiffs and
defendants inherent in the certification decision.' ,63
Still, the court acted outside of its authority in eroding the fraudon-the-market presumption.

"Such policy considerations, ... no

matter how sincerely interpreted or applied, do not give [the Fifth
Circuit] the authority to overrule the Supreme Court's decisions or to
change the recognized elements of a [§] 10(b) claim ....6 In fact, as
the Fifth Circuit has already recognized, "it is the Supreme Court's
job to overrule Basic., 65 These due process concerns do not give
circuit courts the authority to shift the burden of proof established by
the Supreme Court. Absent a conflict with current legislation, the
Basic opinion-establishing a presumption in favor of plaintiffs that
the defendant must actively rebut-is binding on the Fifth Circuit.
The court acted impermissibly in ignoring this.

significant contribution to a price decline demands a peek at the plaintiff's damages model
. ").Yet
....
the majority suggests that the standard for a plaintiff would be high, as the
court rejected the plaintiff's expert opinions and reports as "well-informed speculation."
Id. at 270-71.
59. Basic, 285 U.S. at 242 (Blackmun, J., plurality).
60. Id. at 245.
61. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 267.
62. See id.
63. Id. (quoting Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2005)).
64. Id. at 276 (Dennis, J.,
dissenting).
65. Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 322 n.4 (5th Cir. 2005).
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Yet if allowed to stand, the Oscar court's holding will have

drastic and far-reaching consequences on class action suits brought
under Rule 10b-5. As many courts have recognized, "the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure require only a 'short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' "I that

"[provides] the defendant with 'fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.' "67 The Fifth Circuit's holding
drastically departs from this rule. The court ruled that " 'Rule 23 [of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] requires the court to "find," not
merely assume, the facts favoring class certification.'

"I

As noted

above, the court defined "find" to mean that the plaintiff must have
proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, an element of his case"that the misstatement actually moved the market."69 Such analysis

and consideration of proof at the class certification stage is not
warranted.7" On the contrary, this depth of examination of proof, at
such an early point in the litigation, will push the merits of the case to
the certification stage and inevitably lead to "mini-trials" on those
merits,71 as the court will be required to determine whether the
72

plaintiffs will succeed at trial on a material element of their claim.
This result breaches long-standing public policy, as numerous courts

have recognized that "[c]lass certification hearings should not be
mini-trials on the merits of the class or individual claims."73
66. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)).
67. Id. at 346 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogatedby Bell Atd.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S..... 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1969 (2007)).
68. Oscar,487 F.3d at 267 (emphasis added) (quoting Unger, 401 F.3d at 321).
69. Id. at 265.
70. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) ("We find nothing
in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a
preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be
maintained as a class action.").
71. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 272 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (stating that the Oscar decision will
"[require] mini-trials on the merits of cases at the class certification stage").
72. See id. at 269 (majority opinion). Since the majority in Oscar held that loss
causation required proof "by a preponderance of all admissible evidence" at the class
certification stage, the court required the plaintiffs to meet the trial burden of proof on a
material element of their claim to get certification. By requiring this strict and searching
standard of proof at such an early stage, the court will inevitably invite determination of
the probability of success on the merits at certification. This is impermissible. See, e.g.,
Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177; Stastny v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 275 (4th Cir. 1980).
73. Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Eisen, 417 U.S.
at 177-78. Although the Unger opinion held that " '[g]oing beyond the pleadings is
necessary, as the court must understand the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable
substantive law in order to make a meaningful determination of the certification issues,' "
Unger, 401 F.3d at 321 (quoting Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir.
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[S]uch a procedure contravenes [Rule 23] by allowing a
representative plaintiff to secure the benefits of a class action
without first satisfying the requirements for it. He is thereby
allowed to obtain a determination on the merits of the claims
advanced on behalf of the class without any assurance that a
class action may be maintained .... "In determining the
propriety of a class action, the question is not whether the
plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail
on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23
are met.

74

The Fifth Circuit's decision ignores this policy and pushes aside the
considerations for enforcing different standards at class certification
than those at trial.
Furthermore, the Oscar holding limits the ability of an injured
stockholder to obtain relief. By increasing the standard for
materiality, shifting the rebuttable presumption in favor of plaintiffs
to a burden they must bear, and moving this determination to the
class certification stage, the logical conclusion is that the Fifth
Circuit's holding will make it much more difficult for plaintiffs
alleging securities fraud to succeed in 10b-5 litigation. This increased
difficulty will likely frighten off hesitant investors who fear that there
will be no recourse for misrepresentations, thus chilling market
participation and liquidity. Moreover, the added difficulty for
obtaining a remedy will frustrate the purpose of Rule 10b-5"implementing a 'philosophy of full disclosure' ""-by lessening
accountability of corporations that have made material
misrepresentations regarding their securities.
At the very least, the higher standard established by the Oscar
decision, applicable at the earlier class certification stage rather than
at trial, will logically increase the difficulty of acquiring class
certification.
This is an especially disadvantageous result for
securities fraud litigation.
Class action lawsuits often allow
individuals, whose claims are too small to pursue standing alone, to

1996)), the court only required the plaintiffs to demonstrate that the stock traded in an
efficient market, id. at 325. That opinion did not, at the class certification stage, delve so
far into the substantive matters of the case as to require proof of actual causation-a
separate element of a Rule 10b-5 action from materiality-to allow the fraud-on-themarket presumption. The Oscarholding thus goes much further than Unger.
74. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177-78 (quoting Miller v. Mackey Int'l, 452 F.2d 424, 427 (5th
Cir. 1971)).
75. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977)).
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band together and establish an economically viable suit.76 The benefit
of enabling litigation where the individual complainants' damages are
small is significant in Rule 10b-5 litigation, as many members of a
prospective class may have only purchased a few shares in reliance on
the misrepresentation and therefore will not have enough damages to
bring an action on their own." The result of an opinion like Oscar,
which significantly raised the bar for class certification, will effectively
eliminate any potential for recovery for those investors whose stake
in the corporation was insubstantial. Such an outcome stands
contrary to one of the principal justifications for class action
litigation-enabling suits where the individual class members cannot
maintain actions individually 8-and is detrimental to public policy.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Oscar appears to be a large step
away from precedent. Although it was motivated by an admittedly
legitimate concern-the massive pressure that class certification
creates for settlement 79-the court was acting outside its authority in
fashioning a new standard for Rule 10b-5 actions. Moreover, it could
even be argued that the court was more interested in the defendant's
cost of litigating a class action suit than in the plaintiffs' ability to
acquire remedy for their injuries. The court's drastic revision of the
materiality standard, which significantly lessened the investor
protection upheld in prior cases, seems to be a large departure from
the cases preceding it.
Worse, this departure will unfairly
disadvantage investors and injured parties in future Rule 10b-5 class
actions. First, the decision will interfere with the legislative goals
behind the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5promoting full and honest disclosure-by creating a loophole for

76. See FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.20 (5th ed. 2001); Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class
Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 21, 22 (1996).
77. Barbara Ann Banoff & Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., The Class Action as a Mechanism
for Enforcing the Federal Securities Laws: An EmpiricalStudy of the Burdens Imposed, 31
WAYNE L. REV. 1, 33 (1984); Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and

Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S.
CAL. L. REV. 842,845 (1974).
78. See JAMES, HAZARD & LEUBSDORF, supra note 76, § 10.20; Fiss, supra note 76, at
22.
79. See Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc. 487 F.3d 261, 267 (5th
Cir. 2007). The court's statements regarding the "in terrorem power of certification" and
the "extraordinary leverage" it gives are likely directed toward plaintiffs' increased
leverage in settlement negotiations after attaining certification. Id. at 267; see also LARRY
L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITrEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 750-51 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that
class certification may often induce defendants to settle class actions to avoid the cost of
litigation).
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companies to avoid liability for injuries resulting from the
corporations' misstatements and omissions.8" Second, the holding will
decrease market participation, thus decreasing market liquidity. 1
Finally, the Fifth Circuit's alteration of fraud-on-the-market, from a
rebuttable presumption in favor of injured investors to what is
essentially an affirmative burden on plaintiffs," seems to defeat the
basic purpose and justifications for the theory, 83 increase the burden
on a plaintiff class at the certification stage, and hinder attempts to
acquire recovery for injuries.' 4
Still, it is arguable that this case is just one part of a current trend
eroding the private right of action under Rule 10b-5, at least as
described in Basic.85 In fact, at least one commentator86 has asserted
that the result in Oscar is simply the next logical step from the
Supreme Court's decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Broudo.s7
In that case, the High Court permitted a more searching analysis into
the adequacy of the plaintiff class's proof of loss causation at trial
than in previous cases. 88 Although both the majority89 and dissent9" in

80. See supra notes 36-37, 42-44 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 38, 45-47 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 10-12, 32-41 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
85. See H. Peter Haveles, 'Oscar': Nearing the End of Fraud-on-Market Theory?,
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 27, 2007, at 4, available at http://www.arnoldporter.com (follow "Who We
Are"; then follow "Publications"; then search by author "Haveles").
86. See id.
87. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
88. In Dura, the defendant pharmaceutical company falsely stated that its new
asthmatic spray device would quickly receive U.S. Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") approval, thus causing a rise in its stock price. Id. at 339-40. Later, when the
company announced that the product had not received FDA approval, its stock price
tumbled. Id. at 339. Shareholders who had purchased the defendant's stock between the
two announcement dates filed a class action suit, seeking to establish the loss causation
element of their Rule lob-5 claim based on the allegation that, "on the date of purchase,"
the stock price "was inflated because of the misrepresentation." Id. at 338 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938 (9th
Cir. 2003)). The High Court, permitting a more searching analysis into the adequacy of
the plaintiff class's proof of loss causation than employed in previous cases, struck down
the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 342-43. As Justice Breyer's unanimous opinion explained:
We begin with the Ninth Circuit's basic reason for finding the complaint adequate,
namely, that at the end of the day plaintiffs need only "establish," i.e., prove, that
"the price on the date of purchase was inflated because of the misrepresentation."
In our view, this statement of the law is wrong. Normally, in cases such as this one
(i.e., fraud-on-the-market cases), an inflated purchase price will not itself
constitute or proximately cause the relevant economic loss.
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Oscar explicitly state that the Dura holding was a narrow one, it can
be argued that Dura signaled a new view on the availability of class
action securities fraud litigation, especially in light of the great

incentive class certification gives for settlement. Likewise, the
Court's most recent narrowing interpretation of Rule 10b-5,
Stoneridge Investment Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,9

held that private parties could not bring suits under the theory that
defendants aided and abetted a violation of the Rule because those
plaintiffs could not show reliance on the aider and abettor's conduct.'
Id. at 342 (quoting Dura,339 F.3d at 938). The Dura Court explained that when investors,
such as the plaintiffs in that case, purchase securities with an artificially inflated value due
to a material misrepresentation or omission, they have "suffered no loss" because they
own a share of stock equal in market value to the price paid. Id. After the
misrepresentation or omission comes to light, the security's "lower price may reflect, not
the earlier misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances, changed investor
expectations, ... or other events, which taken separately or together account for some or
all of that lower price." Id. at 343. Thus, the Dura Court required the plaintiffs to prove
loss causation with greater specificity. Id. at 343, 346. Nevertheless, the Dura holding was
a narrow one that only analyzed the loss causation element of Rule 10b-5. Id. at 346.
Dura did not discuss reliance. Moreover, it differs from both Basic and Oscar,as the Dura
Court dismissed the plaintiffs' case for failing to adequately allege economic loss and loss
causation in the pleadings. Id. The Dura analysis does not go beyond the pleadings.
Further discussion of the loss causation element of the Rule 10b-5 claim is outside the
scope of this Recent Development.
89. See Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 265 n.16
(5th Cir. 2007).
90. See id. at 276 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
91. 552 U.S.__, 128 S.Ct. 761 (2008).
92. Id. at -, 128 S. Ct. at 769. In Stoneridge, plaintiffs brought a Rule 10b-5 class
action against the defendant companies, alleging that the defendants engaged in a series of
sham transactions with one of their customers, Charter, to boost Charter's financial
performance. Id. at -, 128 S. Ct. at 767-68. Although the defendants had not made any
public misstatements or violated their duty to disclose, the plaintiffs sought recovery from
the two companies on the theory that they had aided and abetted Charter in conducting "a
scheme to violate" Rule 10b-5. Id. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 767. The Court ruled against the
plaintiffs, finding the class had failed to satisfy the reliance element of Rule 10b-5 because
of the defendants' merely indirect involvement. Id. at -, 128 S. Ct. at 769. The Court
explained:
Respondents have no duty to disclose; and their deceptive acts were not
communicated to the public. No members of the investing public had knowledge,
either actual or presumed, of respondents' deceptive acts during the relevant
times. Petitioner, as a result, cannot show reliance upon any of respondents'
actions except in an indirect chain that we find too remote for liability.
Id. at -, 128 S. Ct. at 769. The Court refused to acknowledge, absent Congressional
approval, a private cause of action for aiding and abetting violations of Rule 10b-5, id. at
-. , 128 S. Ct. at 772-73, despite the fact that the basic private remedy available under lOb5 was of judicial creation, see id. at _, 128 S. Ct. at 769 (citing Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971)). Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter
and Justice Ginsburg, delivered a fiercely written dissent that characterized the majority
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Finally, the Supreme Court's recent holding in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd.,9 a case concerning the Rule's scienter

requirement, may further indicate the trend of imposing additional
limits on Rule 10b-5 actions.9 4 Taken together, these cases seem to

indicate that the Supreme Court and the federal circuits are ready
and willing to erode the availability of private recourse under Rule

10b-5.

opinion as "unduly stringent and unmoored from authority." Id. at _, 128 S. Ct. at 777
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the defendants could be held liable as
principals for employing a" 'deceptive device' prohibited by § 10(b)" rather than as aiders
and abettors. Id. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 774. Nevertheless, as with Dura, Stoneridge was a
narrow holding only addressing aider and abettor liability under Rule 10b-5. Id. at -, 128
S. Ct. at 769 (majority opinion). Further discussion of such liability is outside the scope of
this Recent Development.
93. 551 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007).
94. In Tellabs, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant corporation made false
statements regarding demand for the company's products and revenue projections. Id. at
__ 127 S. Ct. at 2505. When the company later released substantially different results and
the stock price dropped, investors who bought the company's stock between the
misstatements and the later revelation brought suit. Id. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 2505-06. At
issue in the case was the extent to which the plaintiff's complaint had to demonstrate
scienter. Id. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 2506. In PSLRA, Congress determined that, among other
things, the plaintiff's complaint had to "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(b)(2) (2000) (emphasis added). In interpreting the phrase "strong inference," the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held they would "allow [a]
complaint to survive if it alleges facts from which, if true, a reasonable person could infer
that the defendant acted with the required intent." Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v.
Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 602 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated, Tellabs, 551 U.S. at _, 127 S. Ct. at
2513. Yet the Supreme Court overruled this interpretation of "strong inference." Tellabs,
551 U.S. at _, 127 S. Ct. at 2504. Justice Ginsburg explained:
It does not suffice that a reasonable factfinder plausibly could infer from the
complaint's allegations the requisite state of mind. Rather, to determine whether
a complaint's scienter allegations can survive threshold inspection for sufficiency, a
court . .. must consider, not only inferences urged by the plaintiff, as the Seventh
Circuit did, but also competing inferences rationally drawn from the facts alleged.
Id at _, 127 S. Ct. at 2504. The Court ruled that "the inference of scienter must be more
than merely 'reasonable' or 'permissible'-it must be cogent and compelling, thus strong
in light of other explanations." Id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2510. In reaching this result, the
Court accepted one of the stricter definitions from among the circuits' decisions
addressing the scienter element of Rule 10b-5, thus further limiting the potential for
injured plaintiffs to reach trial. See Makor, 437 F.3d at 602; In re Credit Suisse First
Boston Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 49, 51 (1st Cir. 2005), overruled by ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v.
Advest, Inc., No. 07-1367, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 451, at *3 (1st Cir. Jan. 10, 2008);
Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 347-49 (4th Cir. 2003); Pirraglia
v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1187-88 (10th Cir. 2003); Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d
893, 896-97 (9th Cir. 2002); Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 2001 FED App. 0179P,
18-19 (6th
Cir.), 251 F.3d 540, 553. In any event, further discussion on the scienter element of the
claim is outside the scope of this Recent Development.
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In his dissent in Oscar, Judge Dennis adamantly claimed that the
majority's holding will lead to "a split from other circuits."9 5 But
whether other circuits will refuse to follow Oscar, or fall in line with
what may be a new and detrimental trend, is still an open question.
Future courts must decide whether Oscar stands as a rare deviation
from Rule 10b-5 precedent or as one of the first cases establishing a
new standard for securities fraud litigation.
TAD E. THOMPSON

95. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 272 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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